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The Clean Technology Fund and Coal:
A Cautionary Tale for Copenhagen
by Steve Herz*

I

Introduction

n the absence of concerted action, global greenhouse gas
emissions are projected to almost double by 2050. Much of
this increase will come from industrialization in developing
countries.1 Due to resource constraints and the conviction that
developed countries must take responsibility for their historical
emissions, most developing countries are unlikely to act aggressively to restrain their emissions growth without substantial
help from the developed world. Accordingly, the Bali Action
Plan calls for a global deal in which developing countries take
enhanced “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” supported
by technology, financing, and capacity building from the developed world.2 This will require a substantial transfer of resources
and capacity. The Stern Review estimated the incremental costs
of necessary low-carbon investments in developing countries to
be at least $20–30 billion per year.3 So far, however, little assistance has been forthcoming. One of the most important potential outcomes of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) negotiations at Copenhagen will
therefore be the creation of a publicly-funded mechanism that
can provide sufficient concessional resources to help developing
countries transition to lower carbon growth trajectories.
A critical issue that the negotiators will have to resolve is
how to define the mechanism’s funding criteria to ensure that
its concessional funds are used most effectively. This poses an
important strategic choice: will the mechanism focus exclusively
on initiatives that can help catalyze transformational changes in
existing emissions patterns, or will it also provide support for
marginal improvements in the efficiency of existing technologies and practices? While the case for targeting concessional
public funding towards emerging low-carbon technologies is
compelling, there undoubtedly will be significant political pressure from developing countries to allow support to also be used
for incremental improvements in high-emitting sectors.
The recent decision by the World Bank-administered Clean
Technology Fund (“CTF”) to authorize support for certain
coal-fired power plants may provide some insights into how
the UNFCCC may resolve this issue. The CTF has an explicit
mandate to finance “transformational action” to help developing
countries transition to a low-carbon development path.4 Nevertheless, its new financing criteria authorize support for coal
technologies that may be only slightly more efficient than those
that are already preferred by the private-sector, and that include
carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) readiness criteria that have
little chance of ever resulting in the capture or storage of any
carbon dioxide (“CO2”).
21

The CTF’s willingness and ability to contravene its mandate to catalyze transformational change with regard to coal
does not bode well for Copenhagen. The World Bank is likely
to have some influence in the structure of a UNFCCC mechanism, and has an institutional interest in promoting the CTF
standards. Regardless of whether the World Bank plays a role in
the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may look to the CTF
standards as precedent.
Moreover, many of the broader political forces that produced the CTF standards will also be at play in Copenhagen.
Participating countries have not called the CTF to account for
its incrementalism because it largely reflects their policy preferences. Many participating countries are not yet ready to concede
that the Earth’s dwindling carbon sink capacity can no longer
support development strategies based on the relentless expansion of fossil fuel consumption. Unless this political dynamic is
altered at Copenhagen, there is little reason to expect the Parties
to agree to markedly more ambitious criteria for a new UNFCCC
mechanism.

The Clean Technology Fund
The Clean Technology Fund is one of two Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) created by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (“MDBs”) to provide an interim
source of concessional financing while the UNFCCC mechanism is being negotiated.5 The CTF will support public- and
private-sector investments that contribute to “the demonstration, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies with
a significant potential for long term greenhouse gas emissions
savings.”6 Eligible investments include low-carbon power and
transportation projects, and large-scale energy efficient initiatives and other demand management projects.7
Although the CTF is administered by the World Bank, its
decision-making process is partly independent of the governance structure of the Bank and the other MDBs. Every project
funded by the CTF must be approved by both the board of the
implementing MDB and a separate Trust Fund Committee of
the CTF.8 Unlike the weighted voting at the MDBs that heavily
favors donor governments, votes on the Trust Fund Committee
are equally apportioned between eight representatives selected
by the donor countries and eight representatives selected by the
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recipient countries. The committee also includes a non-voting
representative from the World Bank, the other participating
MDBs, and the host country of any investment proposal that is
under consideration.9

The CTF’s Focus on Transformational Change
The stated objective of the CTF is to support “transformational” actions that represent a “step change” over current
practice.10 Towards this end, the CTF provides support for lowcarbon technologies that are approaching the point of “market
take-off,” and that have the potential to significantly reduce
emissions.11 Two categories of technology are eligible for assistance. As a matter of priority, the CTF focuses on technologies
that are already available commercially, but need incremental
assistance to compete with conventional options in the recipient country.12 It will also finance
technologies that have been
proven to be technically viable,
but have not yet been commercially deployed at scale. The
CTF will not support technologies that are still in the research
stage.13
In theory, this is a sound
strategy for targeting public subsidies. Left to their own devices,
private markets may let important new technologies languish
in the “valley of death” between
laboratory success and commercial viability.14 Innovations that
mitigate social costs are particularly vulnerable to getting
bogged down at this stage of
development. Well-targeted public subsidies can provide a critical push to accelerate their commercial uptake.15 Accordingly,
the CTF should target its scarce concessional funds at assistance
that can help accelerate “near market” renewable energy technologies down the cost and learning curves to the point where
they are competitive with fossil fuels.16 And to its credit, the CTF
has recognized that the potential to reduce deployment costs and
increase learning for future investments should be key considerations in its decision to support a proposed investment.17

relatively scarce. Instead of squandering these limited resources
on incremental efficiency improvements for incumbent technologies, the CTF should focus on helping zero-emission alternatives, such as base-load solar, become cost competitive. Indeed,
using concessional public money to subsidize coal—however
efficient—does nothing to hasten the day when low-carbon
technologies can reliably out-compete coal and other fossil fuelbased energy sources.19
The CTF has compounded this strategic error by adopting
permissive criteria for efficiency and CCS-readiness. The CTF
ostensibly precludes the use of its funds to support sub- or supercritical coal power plants.20 Its financing criteria, however, are
not adequate to the task. The Criteria for Financing Low-Carbon
Opportunities in Coal and Gas Power Investments (“Criteria”)
note that “typical” supercritical coal-fired power plants with
emission factors of 0.80 tons
CO2 per megawatt hour (net) (t
CO2/MWh (net)) are now “the
system of choice for new commercial coal-fired plants in many
countries.”21 Nevertheless, the
Secretariat has set the proposed
baseline carbon-intensity threshold for CTF investment at 0.795
t CO2/MWh (net), a mere 0.005 t
CO2/MWh (net) below the emission factor for the current “system of choice.”22 In addition to
being incredibly incrementalist,
this standard may not be consistent with the commitment not to
finance super-critical plants. As
the World Bank’s own private
sector lending arm has noted,
super-critical coal plants can achieve even lower emissions
factors.23
Worse, the 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) threshold is only an initial benchmark; it can be adjusted upward based on specified siteand country-specific conditions.24 This flexibility is not clearly
constrained in the CTF Criteria. The Criteria do not (a) explain
the circumstances in which these upward adjustments will be
allowed; (b) propose any guidelines for MDB staff to implement
them; or (c) establish maximum allowable adjustments. Under
the Criteria, then, the CTF could presumably finance coal projects that are substantially more carbon-intensive than the baseline 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) would appear to require, or even
than the super-critical plants that the Trust Fund Committee has
excluded.
The Criteria also fail to require the use of control technologies for capturing other air pollutants, such as flue gas desulfurizers (“FGD”), selective catalytic reducers (“SCR”), and
low-nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) burners. These technologies are
not necessarily required in developing countries, and their use
reduces the efficiency (and thus increases the CO2 intensity)

Many participating
countries are not yet ready
to concede that the Earth’s
dwindling carbon sink
capacity can no longer
support development
strategies based on the
relentless expansion of
fossil fuel consumption.

An Incrementalist Approach to Coal
Yet, in practice, the CTF has subverted its strategy of facilitating the uptake transformational technologies by authorizing
support for certain coal-fired power plants. Under its new guidelines, the CTF may provide subsidies for coal-fired plants that
meet specified energy efficiency standards and are considered
to be “ready” to capture and store carbon.18 This is a conspicuously ill-advised use of scarce concessional financing for climate
mitigation. Any coal plant financed by the CTF will emit enormous quantities of CO2 for the foreseeable future. Concessional
funds for bringing transformational technologies to market are
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of a coal-fired plant.25 In the absence of specific pollution control standards, the Criteria may allow (or implicitly encourage) operators to meet CO2 emissions standards at the cost of
increased emissions of other pollutants. This, too, is hardly
transformational.

The False Promise of Carbon Capture
and Storage-Readiness
Arguably, the CTF could finance coal projects while meeting its strategic objectives by limiting eligibility to CCS demonstration projects that would help drive innovation and force
down costs. However, the CTF has explicitly eschewed such a
role. Because CCS technology is currently at the research and
development stage, it is not eligible for CTF co-financing, even
on a pilot or demonstration basis.26 Instead, a new coal-fired
power plant need only be “CCS-ready” to be eligible for CTF
financing. Under the CTF Criteria, a plant will be considered
CCS-ready if the project sponsor
has:
a) provided adequate space
in the design of the facility
for the equipment needed to
capture CO2;
b) identified feasible options
to transport CO2 to a storage reservoir that is large
enough to hold the lifetime
emissions of the plant; and
c) conducted an analysis of
CCS options and the viability of plant with CCS operation.27
Due to cost considerations, capital investment in CCS technology is not required.28
The most likely outcome of this approach is that CTFfinanced coal plants will remain “ready” for CCS indefinitely,
but will never actually capture or store any CO2. As one wit has
put it, calling these plants CCS-ready is like calling my driveway “Ferrari-ready:” my driveway can certainly accommodate
a Ferrari, but the chances of one being parked there are vanishingly small.29 Although the basic technology is well understood,30 commercial-scale CCS is not expected to be widely
available for at least 15–20 years.31 In the best-case scenario,
then, these plants will spew CO2 for the first third to half of their
operational lifetimes. In reality, however, there is little reason to
believe that CTF-financed plants will be early adopters of CCS
technology. Since the CTF does not actually require retrofitting,
and since CCS is expected to be extremely expensive and reduce
plant efficiency by as much as a third,32 operators will not retrofit on their own. Only strong regulatory requirements, a steep
price on carbon, or a robust concessional financing regime will
have the potential to induce a plant operator to undertake such
an investment.
None of these potential drivers of CCS uptake currently
exists in the developing world, or is likely to be implemented

in the near to middle term. Few if any developing countries are
seriously considering carbon emissions regimes that would be
stringent enough to eventually induce or require plant operators
to retrofit their facilities with CCS technology. And assuming
such regulations were to be enacted, there is little reason to be
confident that they would be well-enforced. Even in countries
with relatively effective regulatory and enforcement regimes,
utilities have proven to be remarkably adept at avoiding or
delaying mandates to upgrade their facilities to improve environmental performance.33
It is also unlikely that any country that might host a CTFfinanced coal project would implement policies to internalize
the cost of carbon. In the current political environment, such a
proposal would be a non-starter. But even if that were to change
over time, the cost of carbon emissions would have to rise significantly before it would make economic sense to implement
CCS technology. A recent study
by McKinsey estimates the cost
of emissions reductions through
CCS to begin at about $75–115
per ton, and to decline by half
after 2030 when the technology has matured.34 By way of
comparison, the price of carbon
emissions under the European
Trading Scheme is currently
about €13 per ton (approximately U.S. $17 per ton).35
The most likely way that
CTF-financed projects would
ever implement CCS technology, then, is by accessing further concessional funds to finance
the retrofit. But even this is highly speculative and, at best, a
distant prospect. First, CCS is not currently eligible for credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,
the most important existing conduit for such financing.36 While
this would likely change if the technology matured, the availability of carbon credits would not provide sufficient incentives for operators to retrofit until the cost of abating emissions
through CCS falls below the price of carbon credits. This is not
expected to occur until at least 2030.37 Second, it is also possible
that a new UNFCCC financing mechanism could support the
retrofit CTF-financed projects. But even if concessional funds
were made available for CCS retrofits, there is little reason to
believe that CTF-financed projects would be the best candidates
for these funds. Commercial scale CCS is so embryonic that it
is too soon to say which of the currently available coal combustion technologies will prove to be the most cost-effective to
retrofit.38

Although the basic
technology is well
understood, commercialscale CCS is not expected
to be widely available for
at least 15–20 years.

23

Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale
for Copenhagen
The best that can be said for the CTF’s willingness to finance
coal-fired power plants is that, on its own terms, it is not likely
to have a momentous impact on international efforts to redirect
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

developing countries toward lower-carbon development paths.
To date, donors have pledged relatively small sums of money,39
some of which may not be disbursed. And at least some of the
money that eventually reaches the CTF will go to more appropriate technologies. Indeed, the first three loans under consideration
by the CTF, totaling U.S. $900 million, will support renewable
energy and urban transport initiatives, not coal.40 In any event,
the CTF is intended to be a short-term mechanism that will wind
down its operations once the new UNFCCC financial architecture has been put in place.41
The critical question raised by the CTF’s embrace of coal,
then, is what that decision may portend for the criteria to be
adopted by the UNFCCC financing mechanism that is to be
created in Copenhagen in December 2009. That mechanism is
expected to be the primary conduit for developed countries to
meet their obligations to finance the deployment and diffusion
of low-carbon technologies in developing countries. Moreover,
under the Bali Action Plan, the mitigation efforts that developing countries will be expected to undertake will be explicitly
linked to the kinds of financing and support that is provided by
developed countries.42 As a result, the financing criteria adopted
by the UNFCCC mechanism will be a key component of the
effectiveness of the Copenhagen agreements.
The CTF’s affiliation with the World Bank is likely to
enhance its relevance in the Copenhagen negotiations. The
World Bank will continue to be an influential player in Copenhagen, and appears to be positioning itself to play a key role in
the implementation of the UNFCCC mechanism. But even if the
World Bank is not afforded a direct role in the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may consider the CTF standards to be an
important precedent for the UNFCCC’s financing criteria. Historically, there have been numerous examples of World Bank
internal environmental and social standards being widely treated

as international best practice, regardless of their substantive
shortcomings.43
Apart from the World Bank’s role, there are other reasons to be concerned that the criteria adopted by a UNFCCC
mechanism may not be demonstrably better than those of the
CTF. Some developing countries are skeptical of renewable
alternatives—particularly those technologies that are not yet
commonly employed in developed countries. These countries
would prefer to continue to rely on coal despite its environmental disadvantages.44 This preference was expressed in the Trust
Fund Committee’s deliberations over the proposed standards, in
which influential recipient country representatives endorsed the
inclusion of coal and questioned the need for CCS-readiness criteria. It has also been expressed by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. At the CoP-11/CMP-1 in Montreal, the Parties instructed
Annex II countries, and Annex I countries “in a position to do
so” to give priority to “[c]ooperating in the development, diffusion and transfer of less greenhouse-gas-emitting advanced fossil-fuel technologies, and/or technologies relating to fossil fuels
that capture and store greenhouse gases, and encouraging their
wider use . . . .”45
It remains to be seen whether the same political forces
that shaped the CTF criteria will define the parameters of the
UNFCCC mechanism. There is some reason to believe that
the dynamics may be shifting. The U.S. Congress for example,
recently refused to fund the CTF out of concern by some members over the coal financing criteria.46 And perhaps the leadership
of the new U.S. administration, or the urgency and heightened
public scrutiny of the Copenhagen meetings, will create space
for negotiators to take a more ambitious approach to mitigation
financing than was evidenced by the CTF. But unless the political dynamic is changed, there is little reason to expect that the
outcomes will be any different.
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